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CASE SUMMARIES
Department of Revenue v.
Magazine Publishers,
604 So.2d ,459 (Fla. 1992).
INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs, Magazine Publishers of America, Inc.,
The Hearst Corporation, Time, Inc., Golf Digest/
Tennis Inc., and Meredith Corp. a group of magazine
publishers, brought suit against the Florida Depart-
ment of Revenue challenging the constitutionality of a
tax on retail sales of magazines in Florida. The impo-
sition of the tax was found to be unconstitutional
under the First Amendment since the tax exempted
sales of newspapers and was not narrowly drawn to
achieve a compelling state interest. Following Florida
law the Florida Supreme Court held that the differen-
tiation between magazines and newspapers was
invalid and that the newspaper exemption should be
eliminated.
FACTS
The Florida Department of Revenue imposed a
sales tax on the retail sales of magazines. The statute
explicitly exempted the sale of newspapers from the
tax. The trial court granted the plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment, as well as the Summary Judge-
ment Motions of the intervenors, Miami Herald
Publishing Co. and the Florida Press Association,
thereby invalidating the tax on magazines. Upon
appeal by the Department of Revenue, the First
District Court of Appeals certified that the trial court's
order passed upon a question of great public impor-
tance requiring immediate resolution by the Florida
Supreme Court. The Florida Supreme Court heard the
case and upon review reversed the trial court's order
as to the remedy, concluding that the proper solution
under state law was to eliminate the exemption for
newspapers. The United States Supreme Court grant-
ed certiorari upon petition from the Miami Herald
Publishing Co., vacated the judgment of the Florida
Supreme Court and remanded for further considera-
tion in light of Leathers v. Medlock.'
LEGAL ANALYSIS
In deciding whether the tax on magazines violates
the First Amendment, a determination must be made
whether the taxation scheme is a generally applied
scheme or a differential scheme.2 While a state may
impose a generally applied taxation scheme on the
media without raising First Amendment issues, a taxa-
tion scheme which differentiates between members of
the media may trigger strict scrutiny under the First
Amendment.' A differential taxation scheme is subject
to strict scrutiny analysis under the First Amendment
if the tax 1) singles out the press; 2) targets a small
group of speakers; or 3) discriminates on the basis of
the content of the speech.' In order to withstand strict
scrutiny analysis, the tax must serve some compelling
state interest and must be narrowly tailored to achieve
that end.'
The Florida court compared the facts of this case
to Leathers v. Medlock and Arkansas Writers'Project v.
Ragland.' In Leathers, the United States Supreme
Court found an Arkansas differential taxation scheme
valid which imposed a sales tax on cable and satellite
television, but exempted both magazine and newspa-
per sales. The court found that Arkansas was simply
extending a generally applicable sales tax to cable
and satellite services while exempting the print
media. This scheme did not single out the press, tar-
get a small group of speakers or discriminate on the
basis of content, and therefore, did not violate the
First Amendment.7 In Arkansas Writers', the scheme
taxed general magazines but exempted religious, pro-
fessional, trade and sports journals, as well as news-
papers. Here the scheme violated the First
Amendment because the tax burden fell on a small
group of publishers and could not be justified under
strict scrutiny.8 Because the taxation scheme at issue
treats magazines differently than newspapers by
exempting newspapers from the tax, the Florida
Supreme Court found the scheme was differential.9
In determining whether the differential taxation
scheme was content-based, the court looked beyond
the content-neutral language of the statute to consider
the deposition of the Assistant Executive Director of
the Department of Revenue, and the Florida Admin-
istrative Code which guides the Department in imple-
menting the statute. The Director stated that the
Department would "review the content of the publica-
tion" in determining whether it qualifies for the news-
paper exemption under the Florida Administrative
Code. The applicable provisions of the Code specify
the necessary purpose and content for a publication
to constitute a newspaper.1 Therefore, the court con-
cluded that the statute's differential taxation scheme
was content-based and applied strict scrutiny."
In attempting to overcome strict scrutiny, the
Department of Revenue first argued that the newspa-
per exemption served the compelling government
interest of encouraging literacy and general knowl-
edge. The court held that although this was a com-
pelling state interest, magazines as well as newspa-
pers provide an enormous amount of information to
the public, so the statute was not narrowly drawn to
further that end. 2
Next the state argued that the compelling interest
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